Once upon a time there were two college point guards finishing their careers the same season by leading two fairly good college teams. Player A’s team reached slightly greater heights that year, but both had played with other players that would go on to play in the NBA.
By statistical markers, Player A and Player B were quite similar (almost identical scoring, A was slightly better at rebounding, B slightly better at assists, similar shooting marks; player A had a slightly higher PER that final year) and were almost identical in size (good size for the position in college, average for NBA prospects).
As NBA prospects, they had similar outlooks according to draft prognosticators: both were seen to have “reliable backup” as their likely ceiling due to athletic limitations and decent-but-not-great shooting that was questionable to translate to the NBA. Both were regarded as “game managers,” players capable of running an efficient offense, keeping turnovers low, but without much capacity for self-creation. Both were seen as low-ceiling but “safe” picks, likely second-rounders.
And indeed they were both drafted in the late second round, four picks apart. Unsurprisingly, they both spent time – basically a whole year -- in the G-League. While there, once again their performance was more similar than different. Player B had a little better counting stats. Player A generally had a little better efficiency, player-rating, and +/- stats.
Three years after finishing their college careers, the two players’ teams faced each other in the NBA playoffs. Player B (Monte Morris) contributed 14 points and 4 assists to his team’s overtime win in the first game, while Player B (Nigel Williams-Goss) was firmly planted on the bench, though he managed to remain on the Jazz’s roster, much to the bewilderment of most Jazz fans.
The lessons – any or all of the following?:
- Drafting is a crap-shoot
- It’s hard to really predict what a player’s ceiling/floor is
-The Nuggets are great at developing players in-house
-The differences between the players that I didn’t mention make a big difference (Morris is 9 months younger than NWG; Morris’s G-League time was his first season after college while NWG’s was after two years in Europe)
-Patience with prospects (even those that don’t immediately “pop”) is a virtue
-NWG has more to offer than most of us think
-Morris was (for whatever reason) just more successful at overcoming the questions about his NBA viability – he especially improved his shot rather dramatically and gained NBA strength in his body
- Why did the ******* Nuggets have to pick Morris 4 spots before the Jazz could?
By statistical markers, Player A and Player B were quite similar (almost identical scoring, A was slightly better at rebounding, B slightly better at assists, similar shooting marks; player A had a slightly higher PER that final year) and were almost identical in size (good size for the position in college, average for NBA prospects).
As NBA prospects, they had similar outlooks according to draft prognosticators: both were seen to have “reliable backup” as their likely ceiling due to athletic limitations and decent-but-not-great shooting that was questionable to translate to the NBA. Both were regarded as “game managers,” players capable of running an efficient offense, keeping turnovers low, but without much capacity for self-creation. Both were seen as low-ceiling but “safe” picks, likely second-rounders.
And indeed they were both drafted in the late second round, four picks apart. Unsurprisingly, they both spent time – basically a whole year -- in the G-League. While there, once again their performance was more similar than different. Player B had a little better counting stats. Player A generally had a little better efficiency, player-rating, and +/- stats.
Three years after finishing their college careers, the two players’ teams faced each other in the NBA playoffs. Player B (Monte Morris) contributed 14 points and 4 assists to his team’s overtime win in the first game, while Player B (Nigel Williams-Goss) was firmly planted on the bench, though he managed to remain on the Jazz’s roster, much to the bewilderment of most Jazz fans.
The lessons – any or all of the following?:
- Drafting is a crap-shoot
- It’s hard to really predict what a player’s ceiling/floor is
-The Nuggets are great at developing players in-house
-The differences between the players that I didn’t mention make a big difference (Morris is 9 months younger than NWG; Morris’s G-League time was his first season after college while NWG’s was after two years in Europe)
-Patience with prospects (even those that don’t immediately “pop”) is a virtue
-NWG has more to offer than most of us think
-Morris was (for whatever reason) just more successful at overcoming the questions about his NBA viability – he especially improved his shot rather dramatically and gained NBA strength in his body
- Why did the ******* Nuggets have to pick Morris 4 spots before the Jazz could?
