Hopper
Banned
Well, maybe we're just gettin down to very fine semantic nuances, Goat, mebbe not. Personally, I wasn't lookin at only the specific circumstances of the Poe case itself. Poe cited many other cases, and I mainly just looked at the substance of the language, without trying to pigeon-hole the intended import of the statements made into some preconceived concept. Statements like this caught my attention: "The Court has found unfit for adjudication any cause that "is not in any real sense adversary," that "does not assume the `honest and actual antagonistic assertion of rights' to be adjudicated - a safeguard essential to the integrity of the judicial process, and one which we have held to be indispensable to adjudication of constitutional questions by this Court." (citing United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 without stating the underlying facts). I didn't read Johnson, nor did I read any of the other numerous cases cited by Poe, but this language does not really strike me as delineating a "ripeness" issue at all. Nor does it strike me as pertaining to a "lack of injury," per se.
There some references to conclusive notions of "collusion," which strikes me as a concern distinct from a mere "lack of injury," in the cases Poe cited also, such as: "This principle was given early application and has been recurringly enforced in the Court's refusal to entertain cases which disclosed a want of a truly adversary contest, of a collision of actively asserted and differing claims. See, e. g., Cleveland v. Chamberlain, 1 Black 419; Wood-Paper Co. v. Heft, 8 Wall. 333." If someone wants their "due punishment" is it really "punishment?" On one level I guess you could argue that, no, it's actually a welcome reward to that person, and therefore he is not "injured." So, I suppose that you could call "collusion" a lack of injury, if you wanted to confine yourself to the use of an extremely limited number of words to choose from in order to "describe" it.
But in Poe, the stress is (via citing prior cases) seemingly put on such things as "a lively conflict between antagonistic demands, actively pressed" and the avoidance of "friendly suits:" "It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act' (citing Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 344 -345).
To me, this is a concern of sufficiently distinct character so as not to just lump it in with a general "lack of injury."
I do too, as I noted in a post subsequent to the one you are responding to.
Let me ask you another question, Goat: Do you agree that the "cases and controversies" language of Article 3, as interpreted to date, serve to limit the court's "jurisdiction" to decide certain (say unripe) cases? If so, what "kind" of jurisdiction is being limited? Personal jurisdiction? Territorial jurisdiction? Subject matter jurisdiction? A jurisdiction of a totally different kind?
Addendum: I went ahead a took a look at the Johnson case, which itself cites several prior cases for the language quoted in Poe. You can read it yourself, but here's a little excerpt:
"The Government does not contend that, as a result of this cooperation of the two original parties to the litigation, any false or fictitious state of facts was submitted to the court. But it does insist that the affidavits disclose the absence of a genuine adversary issue between the parties...Whenever in the course of litigation such a defect in the proceedings is brought to the court's attention, it may set aside any adjudication thus procured and dismiss the cause without entering judgment on the merits. It is the court's duty to do so where, as here, the public interest has been placed at hazard by the amenities of parties to a suit conducted under the domination of only one of them."
https://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=367&invol=497
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