at the time Okur was extended: Matthews was an undrafted free agent yet to play a single second in the league,
But at the time Okur's contract
ended, Matthews had played a year in the league, and that's when the Jazz should've considered extending Okur, instead of the year before, for precisely these reasons: to have more data on how Okur was doing (he regressed in his last year of the first contract after the extension was already sign) and to see who was out there who would be more valuable (i.e., a Matthews with huge upside for the equally anemic wing spot rather than a declining Okur).
Koufos was coming off his rookie season in which he imploded after the first half,
Koufos was coming along OK until about February when Sloan, without any reason whatsoever, demoted his modest minutes to mere scraps. Koufos lost development, and Sloan made no effort to find time for him. While it was disappointing that KK didn't really recover until after he was traded, the effort on finding development minutes for him (even when the existing rotation was sucking wind or when the outcome of the game was not in question) was virtually nonexistent.
For Koufos, any weak argument that he wasn't putting forth effort in practice is moot, because he was a diligent worker. But like with Fesenko, the coaching staff made no attempt whatsoever to grant him more than about 5 minutes per available game (after you average in the multiple DNPs especially in the second half of the season), and that's not enough time for a player--diligent or not--to develop, especially if he's a big man. This is a trend that was repeated several times in the Sloan era and is a core reason why Sloan should have been let go gracefully a long time ago--and is also a core reason why Utah wasn't a legitimate contender since Stockton-to-Malone: the supporting cast wasn't sufficiently developed.
Fesenko played all of 156 minutes the previous season, and Elson was under contract with another team.
The scanty minutes for Fesenko are symptomatic of the same coaching fallacy that was committed with Koufos. The key difference here is that--on average--Fesenko had more positive impact than KK, but his off-court work ethic gave Sloan an excuse not to play him (even though on-court performance is what matters, and even though the existing big-man rotation not named Millsap was piss-poor on D, warranting the scrubs to come in for a few minutes at a time anyway just to enforce performance among the regular rotation, including Okur).
and yet you wonder why KOC chose to extend Okur for just two seasons (Haywood got six) instead of going with your plan.
An analysis of the rest of the team is not necessary to come to the valid conclusion that re-signing Okur was not worth it; analyzing the alternatives (Matthews,
when Okur's contract was actually over) and the replacements (developing a half-way decent defensive center was a better complement to Boozer and Millsap than Okur was anyway) merely supported the no-go decision. In 2009, Okur was already slowing down, making his defense even more so-so than it was, and thus an analysis of Okur's potential should have been all that was necessary. The rest is only gravy.
the truth is, after getting Okur to sign for just two more years he probably figured you haters would rejoice. if he got injured, he'd be gone in just three seasons, instead of the six that Boozer was insisting on getting.
It's not much of a consolation that it was a bad contract for only two years rather than longer. And the notion that beating your head against the wall for two hours feels better than for longer isn't much consolation, either.
